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ESSAY RESPONSE TO ASYMMETRIES IN THE GENERATION AND 
TRANSMISSION OF WEALTH 
REID KRESS WEISBORD* 
In an excellent recent Article, Asymmetries in the Generation and 
Transmission of Wealth, Professor Felix Chang offers a bold critique of the 
freedom of disposition,1 the venerable organizing principle of wealth transfer 
law in the United States.2 With plainspoken eloquence, Chang argues that 
wealth transfer law should not aim merely to facilitate private donative 
preferences, but rather, it should also promote social welfare in ways that 
reduce economic inequality and stimulate wealth redistribution.3 Chang 
supports this claim by identifying a previously overlooked asymmetry between 
the under-regulation of wealth transmission and the more robustly progressive 
economic regulation of wealth generation.4 Mustering sophisticated command 
of social welfare and law-and-economics theory, Chang offers several 
innovative reform proposals to slow the trend of increasing wealth inequality 
by redistributing capital across the vast majority of individuals who live 
outside the elite top percentile of asset ownership.  
Chang begins with a normative assertion that public policy should 
constrain wealth inequality because high concentrations of capital ownership 
inhibit economic growth; this inhibition, in turn, causes wage stagnation, 
unemployment, and depressed productivity, among other social harms.5 Chang 
observes that the extant state of economic disparity arises, at least in part, from 
wealthy elites exerting political power over lawmakers to favor policies that 
exacerbate and entrench the problem of wealth inequality.6 At the same time, 
the social service expenditures most beneficial to the poor and middle classes, 
such as public health and education programs, have waned from chronic 
underfunding.7 Many scholars have therefore come to view wealth inequality 
as a social problem that perpetuates institutionalized disadvantages for the 
poor and facilitates anti-democratic political influence by a small class of 
affluent elites.8  
The social welfare harms and anti-democratic side-effects of wealth 
inequality are most pronounced when the distribution of economic resources 
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across society becomes highly disproportionate.9 The threshold question, 
therefore, is one of degree: How much economic disparity is enough to 
manifest a measurable adverse impact on social welfare? A growing empirical 
literature in the field of economics has sought to quantify and measure the 
extent of wealth inequality,10 but reasonable minds may differ about how 
much capital accumulation by the richest elite is tolerable by society before 
reaching a level of economic disparity that requires regulatory intervention. 
Most Americans would probably agree that a capitalist free-market political 
system must tolerate at least some level of wealth inequality, but how much?  
At one end of the spectrum, libertarians might argue that society should be 
highly tolerant of economic inequality because ability, talent, and willingness 
to devote time and labor to economic activity vary significantly from one 
person to the next, so the reward outputs from labor, effort, skill, and 
productivity should be expected to vary as well. A policy of mandating 
economic equality, therefore, would not only untenably infringe upon liberal 
principles of individual autonomy and private property, but would also 
severely depress incentives to engage in activities that require innovation and 
assumption of economic risk. Proponents of this view would cite the 
communist political systems that amassed great power in the twentieth 
century, but that subsequently collapsed (Soviet Union)11 or largely abandoned 
their most extreme redistributive policies (China).12 At the other extreme end 
of the resource distribution spectrum, progressive advocates of economic 
equality might argue that an entirely free-market system leaving wealth 
inequality completely unchecked not only harms the poor and middle classes, 
but it can destabilize the foundations of civil order, as King Louis XVI of 
France13 and Czar Nicholas II of Russia14 discovered the hard way at the hands 
of an angry, impoverished populace.  
While economic distribution preferences are highly variable and difficult 
to measure, recent studies have shown that Americans tend to prefer a more 
equal distribution of capital across society.15 And yet, other studies show that 
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Americans tend to underestimate the true extent of wealth inequality.16 Among 
the wealthy (and soon-to-be wealthy) elite, however, distributional preferences 
tend to skew toward greater tolerance of wealth inequality. Consider, for 
example, a fascinating recent study of distributional preferences among Yale 
Law School students, who, by virtue of their educational pedigree, are likely to 
join the ranks of the influential political and economic elite.17 Almost all study 
participants in the Yale Law School student cohort identified as members of 
the Democratic Party, an affiliation that would seem to imply agreement with 
progressive ideas about economic equality.18 But when compared to study 
participants regarded as less elite, the Yale student cohort exhibited a 
significantly higher preference for efficiency over equality and conducted 
themselves in a manner described by researchers as more “selfish” than “fair-
minded” than the control group cohorts.19 Thus, even the most progressively 
minded elite may unconsciously behave in ways that promote rather than 
curtail wealth inequality. 
Economic inequality in the United States is not extreme enough to presage 
a political revolution, but the current level of wealth concentration is 
astonishingly high. By one measure, for example, the richest 20% of 
Americans now own more than 95% of all capital wealth in the United 
States.20 In another study, renowned French economist Thomas Piketty 
estimated that, as of 2010, the richest 1% of Americans owned nearly 35% of 
all capital assets in the United States.21 Chang, therefore, laments the downfall 
of political support for federal transfer taxes, which once served as the 
government’s primary tool for curbing wealth concentration.22 The gift, estate, 
and generation-skipping transfer taxes impose excise taxes on the privilege of 
transferring wealth, but opponents of federal transfer taxes have long argued 
that this produces double taxation after payment of income taxes and disrupt 
family businesses by requiring liquidation of business assets to satisfy large 
tax obligations.23 Such criticisms are largely overblown, as Congress has 
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enacted solutions, such as a fourteen-year payment deferral for closely held 
businesses,24 to prevent family farms and businesses from having to liquidate 
assets to pay federal transfer taxes. And indeed, in recent decades, Congress 
significantly scaled back the wealth transfer taxes by reducing the tax rate 
from 77% to 35%, since increased to 40%, and significantly increasing the 
exemption amount from $40,000 to more than $5 million.25 In 2017, President 
Donald Trump proposed eliminating the estate and generation-skipping 
transfer taxes altogether.26 Congress did not fully embrace the White House 
repeal proposal, but it did temporarily double the transfer tax exemption 
amount to $11.2 million for individuals and $22.4 million for married couples, 
as of 2018.27 
Because Chang believes (as do I) that recent efforts to scale back federal 
transfer taxes will eventually become permanent,28 he suggests that law 
reformers should focus on the non-tax rules of wealth transfer law to pursue 
wealth redistribution and promote social welfare.29 And yet, so many aspects 
of wealth transfer law are inextricably intertwined with transfer tax law that it 
becomes difficult to exclude consideration of transfer taxes from social 
welfare policy reform.  
Take, for example, the Rule Against Perpetuities, which Chang argues 
should be strengthened and reinstated so as to constrain the inter-generational 
accumulation of wealth.30 While the Rule Against Perpetuities is, itself, a non-
tax rule of wealth transfer law, two of Chang’s reform proposals reflect the 
long shadow cast by the transfer tax system on the state property laws 
governing perpetuities. One of Chang’s proposals suggests that states directly 
tax dynasty trusts, which would effectively impose a transfer tax at the state 
rather than federal level.31 But if transfer taxes have proven politically 
untenable under federal law, it seems unlikely that state legislatures would 
choose to impose a similar tax at the state level. Another of Chang’s proposals 
suggests that states should reinstate the common law Rule Against Perpetuities 
“to abolish the inter-state race to the bottom.”32 The race to which Chang 
refers is the trend among state jurisdictions to authorize dynasty trusts that 
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exploit a wide loophole for perpetual trusts under the federal Generation-
Skipping Transfer Tax.33 Yet, if federal transfer taxes are eventually repealed 
entirely and permanently, then the race to authorize dynasty trusts would no 
longer serve its intended purpose of providing perpetual exemption from the 
GST tax because all transfers would pass tax-free whether or not conveyed in 
trust. Chang acknowledges that “the efficacy of [reinstating the Rule Against 
Perpetuities] depends as much on the robustness of estate taxes as on the 
perpetuities period; where tax exemptions are large and tax rates slim, the 
redistributive effects of the RAP will be hampered.”34 In the field of wealth 
transfer law, which evolved over time in a symbiotic relationship to transfer 
tax law, it is difficult to conceive of redistributive reforms that are wholly 
divorced from tax law. 
Thus, I agree with Chang both in that “the tax system is the most efficient 
way to address inequality,”35 and that federal transfer taxes as presently 
configured are (at best) on the decline and (at worst) on the road to outright 
repeal.36 And yet, I am decidedly more optimistic about the potential for new 
configurations of death-time government claims to serve a more robust and 
meaningful role in promoting social welfare. With a bit of legislative 
creativity, lawmakers may find other ways to repurpose the well-tested 
statutory and regulatory transfer tax framework to achieve the redistributive 
goals of greater wealth equality without actually imposing a wealth transfer 
tax in its conventional form.  
Consider, for example, an application of the transfer tax apparatus in the 
context of entitlement reform, which may soon require austerity measures to 
contain the rapidly increasing costs of the Medicare and Social Security 
retirement benefit programs. To date, Congress has rejected austerity reforms 
that would disqualify retirees with ample independent financial resources from 
collecting Medicare and Social Security retirement benefits.37 Under current 
law, individuals who meet the age and eligibility requirements may participate 
in the Medicare and Social Security old-age programs without regard to 
financial need (or lack thereof).38 By contrast, so-called “means testing” 
proposals would establish income and asset ceilings to limit Medicare and 
Social Security eligibility only to individuals who could not otherwise afford 
to retire.39 Financial means testing, however, may prove highly unpopular if 
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imposed on individuals who contributed payroll taxes into the system with the 
expectation of collecting retirement benefits from both programs upon 
reaching the statutory definition of old age. Restricting entitlement eligibility 
may also discourage individuals from saving for retirement so as to avoid 
hitting the disqualification ceiling.  
But what if entitlement eligibility restrictions were imposed at death rather 
than at retirement? As I propose elsewhere, the political unpopularity of 
austerity measures could perhaps be appeased by gradually phasing in a 
system of postmortem, retroactive disqualification for wealthy decedents who 
leave behind large estates.40 For such decedents, lack of financial need for the 
entitlements paid during life could be objectively and definitively determined 
at death whenever a decedent’s estate exceeds a high dollar amount threshold. 
Such estates would then be liable for paying back some or all of Social 
Security and Medicare benefits paid to the decedent during life. A system of 
postmortem austerity implemented for the purpose of entitlement reform could 
repackage the concept of federal transfer taxation as a postmortem government 
claim for disqualified benefits against a decedent’s estate rather than as an 
excise tax on the decedent’s transfer of wealth. As further described below, 
such a program would have to balance the vested interests of current 
beneficiaries against future needs: 
To avoid constitutional challenge and reduce incentives for wasteful end-of-
life consumption, postmortem austerity should not entirely deprive 
disqualified participants of the power to transmit property at death. One way 
to preserve the freedom of disposition would be to cap the overall recoverable 
amount of disqualified benefits at 40% of the decedent’s estate, thereby 
leaving the decedent with testamentary power over the remaining 60% of 
assets owned at death. Further, to implement austerity progressively, the 
amount of the repayment obligation might be tied to the size of the estate, 
such that an estate of $1 million would be liable for 25% of the cost of 
lifetime benefit outlays while an estate of $10 million would be initially liable 
for 100% of that cost. A disqualification ceiling would also help retain the 
insurance function of Medicare by relieving estates of the full burden of any 
extraordinary medical costs incurred by the decedent. The repayment 
obligation should also be offset by Medicare premiums paid by the decedent 
while receiving medical benefits during life. To avoid disruption within the 
family unit, the repayment obligation should be deferred until the death of a 
surviving spouse. And, to facilitate adequate advance planning, 
implementation of any austerity reform should be phased in with at least 
fifteen years’ notice such that any new eligibility rule would not apply to 
anyone currently over the age of fifty.41 
A postmortem austerity reform patterned after the federal transfer tax 
system would: (1) allow all individuals to remain eligible for entitlement 
benefits during life (and, thus, relieve any fear of old age impoverishment), (2) 
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reduce incentives created by a conventional means testing system to avoid 
saving for retirement; (3) promote progressive goals of redistribution by 
confining benefit disqualification rules to estates left behind by wealthy 
decedents who were demonstrably capable of paying for their own expenses 
during life; (4) encourage at least some wealthy individuals to voluntarily opt 
out of Social Security and Medicare during life, thereby conserving scarce 
public resources for individuals in need of old age financial support; and (5) 
enable wealthy individuals to plan for the postmortem repayment obligation in 
a manner that minimizes adverse impact on the decedent’s survivors.42 Such 
reforms would seem comfortably aligned with Chang’s proposal to promote 
wealth redistribution through reforms that do not rely on the ever-unpopular 
federal transfer tax system in its current form.  
Professor Chang deserves much praise for opening a new dialogue about 
the adverse economic and distributive impacts of wealth transfer law. He has 
laudably encouraged lawmakers to consider innovative reforms to reduce 
extreme concentrations of capital in the hands of a small class of ultra-rich 
elites and to reverse the resulting anti-democratic influences produced by 
wealth inequality. As legislators persuaded by Chang’s clarion call begin their 
search for creative law reform solutions, however, I hope they will not entirely 
overlook the highly reliable and well-tested regulatory structure of the federal 
transfer tax system, despite recent decades of successful lobbying efforts 
eliminate the so-called “death tax.” There are, indeed, promising ways in 
which our century of experience with transfer taxation may be repurposed in 
other contexts, such as entitlement reform, to achieve the ends of wealth 
redistribution and greater economic equality. 
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